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1NO-FIRST-USE AND THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE
"Two roads diverged m  a wood, and I - 
I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference '
Robert Frost
Introduction
NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons to deter and, if 
necessary, repel a Soviet invasion of Western Europe has beer 
the corner-stone of its military policy Early US plans for 
defending Europe closely approximated World War II operations, 
with the atomic weapon configured therein as another element of 
fire-power For its part, the North Atlantic Council authorized 
its military commanders m  December 1954 to factor use of 
nuclear weapons into their strategic plans, irrespective of the 
aggressor's own conduct m  this regard 1 NATO's conventional 
forces were to be the "trip-wire" for activating the nuclear 
fuse to contain the anticipated Soviet invasion History, 
therefore, sanctifies NATO's first-use strategy this has 
continued though seminal changes in nuclear doctrine have 
occurred over the intervening decades
The most epochal change was the reformulation of the
Z"massive retaliation" doctrine to accomodate "flexible resporse" 
in the use of nuclear weapons, which was finally accepted as 
NATO policy m  1967 As perceived by McNamara, U S policy 
thereafter visualised that,
we, m  effect, proposed confining nuclear weapons to orly
two roles m  the NATO context
- deterring the Soviet's initiation of nuclear war,
- as a weapon of last resort, if conventional deferce 
failed, to persuade the aggressor to terminate the 
conflict on acceptable terms ¿
Strategic parity with the Soviet Union was accepted by the 
Nixon Administration The subsequent evolution of the 
Schlesinger doctrine in 1974-75, Presidential Directive 59 
issued by the Carter Administration, and the Reagar 
Administration's National Security Decision Directive 13, sigred 
ir October 1981, have refined targeting policies These row 
envisage destruction of the Soviet political and military 
structure, high damage to the Soviet economic and military base, 
and an enhanced capabuty to sustain nuclear attacks over ar 
extended time-frame  ^ Only lip-service was paid, however, to 
the concept that the NATO Triad— conventional, tactical nuclear 
and strategic forces— would provide the instrumentality for 
graduating the scale of conflict Indeed, no concerted efforts 
were made, until the recent framing of NATO’s Long-Term Deferce 
Programme m  1977 visualizing a 3% annual increase m  deferce 
outlays, to strengthen conventional forces and seek deterrence 
at the conventional level McNamara has noted, incidentally, 
that an "essential element" of the flexible response policy was 
"building sufficient conventional capabilities to offset those
Iof the Warsaw Pact [which ] has never been achieved "4
The political will needed to set apart adequate outlays 
for strengthening NATO's conventional forces was understardably 
not available in the difficult early years of its existerce 
But, it continues to be missing, for which weak governments, 
absence of defence lobbies and a four-decade long peace ir 
Europe might be contributory reasons This is inexplicable 
because nuclear parity between the superpowers might suggest 
that deterrence of the Soviet threat would be premised, more 
realistically, upon denial by conventional arms, with the U S 
nuclear threat being reserved as a last-resort optior Instead, 
NATO s conventional forces remain comparatively neglected, 
whilst much anxiety obtains about the credibility of the nuclear 
guarantee
The no-first-use proposal must be evaluated against this 
background, initially considering the reasons for the revival of 
this debate, and the m a m  objections to this proposal An 
examination of the proposal would, thereafter, be attempted, by 
discussing the following questions
(A) Is Warsaw Pact conventional forces superiority 
established’
(B) Can the Alliance bear the cost of modernizing its 
conventional forces’
(C) Is limited nuclear conflict possible’
(D) Would a no-first-use declaration decouple the United
4States and West Europe, unraveling the Atlantic Alliance‘s
Further, the debate on this question has proceeded, thus 
far, within concerned American-West European communities, ard 
has focussed upon their mutual pexceptions of this issue as a 
NATO problem Hardly any consideration has been given to 
debates m  international forums like the United Nations on this 
question It would be sought, therefore, to enlarge the ambit 
of this proposal by considering the perceptions of the other 
nuclear weapons powers and the non-nuclear-weapons powers The 
larger implications of a no-first-use declaration m  the global 
context and its repercussions on mternatiopnal peace and 
stability would, thereafter, be discussed, before drawing 
appropriate conclusions
The Debate
Why has the present debate over no-first-use arisen’ It 
was initiated, indubitably, by the two "Gang of Four" essays ir 
Foreign Affairs,** setting forth diametrically opposed 
view-points on this question Possibly, certain incautious, but 
provocative, statements by prominent members of the Reagan 
Administration, suggesting the feasibility of nuclear war, might 
have heightened dormant fears The fading of detente, failure 
to reach a SALT-II accord, steady progression of the nuclear 
arms race, controversies attending the deployment of new weapon 
systems in Europe-neutron bomb, SS-20 missiles and the 
INF might also have strengthened beliefs that a nuclear abyss
swas being approached Whatever the reasjpons, the debate has 
illuminated the important, unresolved questions underpinning 
NATO's nuclear posture such as the credibility of American 
extended deterrence, whether the British or French nuclear 
forces would undertake greater responsibilities for Europe's 
defence, the system of "dual control" over NATO's nuclear 
weaponry, and the Federal Republic's special dilemma that it 
would be destroyed m  the process of being saved from a Warsaw 
Pact attack
It would be useful at this juncture to set forth the m a m  
arguments m  favor of maintaining the status-quo, and against a 
no-first-use declaration ^
- The Soviet Union might be encouraged to risk aggression from 
which it has been contrained, despite the overwhelming 
superiority of its conventional forces
- Since even the conventional defence of Europe, notably West 
Germany, would lead to its destruction, faith must be reposed ir 
nuclear deterrence to maintain the peace
- Nuclear weapons provide for a cheaper defense of Europe 
strengthening conventional forces could weaken the resolve to 
cross the nuclear threshold m  European perceptions
To counter the Warsaw Pact at the conventional level, NATO
would have to increase its own conventional capabilities 
dramatically, with consequent political (draft, extension of 
military service) and economic (raising defence and reducing 
welfare expenditure) problems
- The United States would, m  effect, be abrogating its nuclear 
guarantee to the Alliarce, which could destroy Alliance security 
and unty, founded upon its indivisibility
Europe's choices, after a no-first-use declaration, would lie 
between establishing an independent deterrent or retreating irto 
neutralism
Renunciation of nuclear weapons by a no-first-use declaration 
would devalue the general prohibition against the use of force 
enshrined m  the U N Charter
An evaluation can now be made whether a no-first-use 
policy for the defence of Europe is militarily ard politically 
feasible, focussing upon the following germaine issues
i(A) Is Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces Superiority Established^
It has long been held by NATO powers that the Warsaw Pact 
possesses a marked superiority m  manpower, weapon systems ard 
logistical advantages, which would enable it to rapidly domirate 
West Europe m  a conventional conflict This assumption, 
however, is based on two further premises that NATO would 
suffer a paralysis of will and be unable to mobilize an adequate 
defence, and that the Warsaw Pact would be able to mass its 
troops to launch and sustain its offensive without being 
detected by NATO's considerable intelligence capabilities Such 
a concatenation of circumstances is, obviously, improbable 
Whether the Warsaw Pact would launch such an attack is itself 
questionable, and it is dubious if the Soviet leadership after 
Stalin has even considered the invasion of West Europe 
seriously, because "Soviet leaders are well aware of the 
enormous political risks m  large-scale aggression through the 
lands of unhappy vassals into territory where Soviet armies 
would find no friends "7 There would also be uncertainty 
whether China might activate the Smo-Soviet border, and whether 
a global conflagration might result with the United States
Argued from the perspective of the military balance 
obtaining, it needs initial recognition that manpower and weapon 
■>€* systems comparisons require trade-offs between a large number of
8variables like mobilization time-frames, weapon characteristics, 
performance data, state of serviceability, logistics/terrair/ 
communications advantages and disadvantages and so on, 
evaluations regarding which can differ widely The presence of 
imponderables, moreover, like troop morale, quality of trainrg, 
combat experience and related factors introduces a quality of 
uncertainty, making such evaluations, at best, inconclusive 
Military high commands, incidentally, urge a 3 1 superiority 
over opposing forces to ensure the success of offensive 
operations Attention might also be profitably drawn now to a 
prominent study m  the mid-sixties concluding that NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact had "approximate equality on the ground Where four 
years earlier it had appeared that a conventional option was 
impossible, it now began to appear that perhaps NATO could have
ghad one all along " Competent force comparisons made 
thereafter of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, either initially or
qupon mobilization, have come to the same conclusion An 
attempt to broadly set forth present manpower and major 
equipment holdings of the two blocs has been made ir Appendix I, 
which does not reveal any overwhelming superiority of the Warsaw 
Pact It would be instructive to quote the authoritative 
Military Balance also m  this regard
Our conclusion remains that the overall balance cortirues 
to be such as to make military aggression a highly risky 
undertaking Though tactical redeployments could certairly 
provide a local advantage m  numbers sufficient to allow ar 
attacker to believe that he might achieve limited tactical 
success, there would still appear to be insufficient 
strength on either side to guarantee victory
Apart from force comparisons, military geography largely
9influences operational planning Conventional offensive 
operations must be developed across a narrow front to achieve a 
breakthrough, rapidly gain momentum, and reach a favorable 
decision quickly m  Central Europe, however, the presence of 
natural geographical obstacles.and built-up areas would channel 
the Warsaw Pact offensive into well-recognized ingress 
routes— Fulda Gap, Gottingen corridor. North German plains and, 
less probably, the Hof corridor These could be effectively 
defended with some greater efforts Precision-guided munitions 
(PGMs), with their high accuracy and lethality, could make such 
defensive tasks easier First-generation PGMs belonging to the 
Sente of anti-tank missiles and surface-to-air missiles proved 
their efficacy m  the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 The lethality 
of air-to-sea missiles was established in the Falklands War, 
whilst the effectiveness of air-to-air and air-to-surface 
missiles was demonstrated m  the Israeli attack upon Syrian air 
force and anti-aircraft positions in the Bekaa Valley m  1982 
Future developments in new military technologies, e g , sensors 
for radar systems, infrared imagery and optical guidance, 
electronics for data storage and processing by computers, 
inertial guidance for improving missile accuracies, and, 
chemical warfare like binary agents, would vastly improve the 
defensive capabilities of conventional forces 11 The Alliance 
has a definite edge over the Warsaw Pact in these new military 
technologies, consequently, greater confidence might be reposed 
by NATO on non-nuclear means to disrupt a Warsaw Pact offensive, 
rather than depend upon escalating to nuclear levels
Some NATO concerns can now be discussed
Firstly, France has withdrawn from NATO's integrated 
military structure Therefore, its present informal liaisor 
arrangements with NATO, deployment of three division m  West 
Germany, and declarations that it would join NATO m  repulsirg a 
Warsaw Pact invasion do not adequately reassure the Alliarce 
about France's likely conduct in a crisis NATO's perceived 
vulnerability due to Frerch ambiguity, however, is 
counter-balanced by major Soviet vulnerabilities Could Polish 
or Czech forces be relied upon for the invasion’ Could East 
German forces be utilized agairst West Germany’ A balarce of 
liabilities would seem to exist between the two blocs ir this 
regard
Secondly, it is believed that the defence of West Berlir, 
surrounded by East German territory, would become impossibile 
without the insurance of nuclear weapons These fears have 
historical roots in the Berlin crisis of 1948 and 1961, ard it 
bears recollection that the first crisis was forced by a 
non-nuclear Soviet Unior against a nuclear United States It is 
improbable, however, that the Soviet Union would risk a 
confrontation with NATO, and the likelihood of conflict 
extending to other theatres, solely to occupy West Berlir 
Speculations regarding Soviet intransigence over West Berlin 
must be accorded the same probability, therefore, as a Soviet
Ji
invasion of West Europe, which is unlikely m  the present 
milieu Furthermore, a nuclear response by NATO to a 
hypothetical Soviet assault upon West Berlin is subject to the 
same dangers of escalation to general nuclear war as elsewhere 
m  the European theatre
Thirdly, NATO forces are believed to lack a 
communications zone of sufficient depth to protect its supply 
routes for a sustained conventional operation Alongwith 
beliefs that strategic withdrawal in West Germany is not 
politically feasible, and that its defence must be premised on 
deterrence of both nuclear and conventional war, such 
perceptions have shaped NATO's "forward defence" policy 
Militarily this policy is difficult to implement, since limited 
inroads can always be made by invading forces due to the weight 
of the offensive, and need to be countered m  other areas A 
viable NATO strategy, m  theoretical terms, could, based or 
tactical flexibility, consider retaliatory ground-air operations 
in East Germany in preference to crossing the nuclear threshold 
Improved mobilization procedures, increased reserve formations, 
and pre-positioning military supplies, moreover, could augment 
NATO's defensive capabilities Construction of tank obstacles 
and pill-boxes, and laying of minefields could also disrupt the 
offensive and support counter-attacks None of these measures, 
incidentally, could be considered provocative
Fourthly, NATO's dilatory decision-making process causes
12
concern It is clear that release of nuclear weapors in the 
European theatre requires a joint decision by the North Atlantic 
Council and the U S President, and that "guidelines on the 
initial selective use of nuclear weapons" have been adopted 
No agreement regarding follow-on-use, however, exist, nor haie 
release procedures been clarified m  war-gaming exercises the 
authority to use nuclear weapons was seldom given 12 
Indubitably, a streamlining of NATO's communications and 
decision-making procedures would enable major operational 
decisions being taken quickly in emergency situations it is 
arguable, however, that a no-first-use policy would permit the 
existing decision-making structures to reach consensus less 
traumatically, if only conventional forces were to be used It 
might, conceivably, also become easier to reform the obtaining 
decision-making process if the nuclear dimension is excluded 
from consideration
The problem, however, remains a no-first-use declaration 
cannot reassure against conventional or nuclear aggression by 
the Warsaw Pact The Soviet Union could, indeed, be encouraged 
to contemplate the invasion of West Europe and, perhaps, 
abrogate its own first-use declaration should circumstances so 
require Elementary prudence, therefore, requires NATO to 
retain its nuclear shield, and not be enticed into any 
no-first-use pledges The essence of such beliefs derives from 
the conviction that NATO's nuclear threat creates a level of 
uncertainty in Soviet perceptions which deters conventional,
!
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apart from nuclear, aggression Withdrawal of the nuclear 
threat would be tantamount to surrender There is also the 
suspicion that
it is unreasonable to expect that promises made with 
cool reason m  peacetime will be kept in the heat of battle 
when a nation is threatened with military conquest Either 
a defensive nuclear response to conventional attack, or a 
preemptive nuclear strike by the aggressor will sj^ll remair 
possibilities regardless of declaratory policies
It was conceded, incidentally, in the Bundy essay that
no one on either side could guarantee beyond all 
possible doubt that if conventional warfare broke out or a 
large scale there would in fact be no use of nuclear 
weapons We could not make that assumption about the Soviet 
Union, and we must recognize that Soviet leaders could rot 
make it about us As long as the weapons, jjhemselves exist, 
the possibility of their use will remain
These beliefs could be questioned on five counts
First, the Cold War decades, whilst perpetrating Westerr 
fears of Soviet intransigence, have revealed the increasing 
difficulties of sustaining this posture Obtaining perceptions 
among the Europeans suggest that they are less convinced about 
unrelenting Soviet intransigence than the United States, ard 
more cognizant that, even if conventional deterrence fails, the 
nuclear defence of Europe would result in its annihilation A 
dichotomy between seminal European and American beliefs 
regarding the intensity of the Soviet threat maybe noticed
Second, the intention of the no-first-use declaration is 
to keep possible conflict below the nuclear level But, the
14 / Ii
declaration cannot be a substitute for on-going efforjts to seek 
deterrence in the conventional and nuclear spheres lüeterte ard 
peace would need to be sought through diplomatic endeavours,
although a favorable ambience for these pursuits would
undoubtedly be created by the declaration
Third, the declaration, simpliciter, prohibits the first 
use of nuclear weapons in conflict, and not secord or subsequent 
use A no-first-use declaration, consequently, would not 
prohibit retaliation against nuclear attack The traditional 
cautiousness of the Soviet Union suggests that it wou! 
reach the nuclear level, except in extremis Should 
however, indulge in a "defensive nuclear response" or a 
preemptive nuclear strike" the declaration would, ijso facto, 
become inoperative, permitting a nuclear riposte
Id not 
it,
Fourth, the Soviet Union would be aware that crossirg the
nuclear threshold carries the grave risk of nuclear 
counter-attack, imbuing the conflict with dangerous e'scalatory 
potentialities This consideration, might, indeed, heighten
I
Soviet circumspection, especially in the "heat of battle "
Fifth, it would be unfair to allege that international 
obligations undertaken by responsible nations would tje lightly 
treated Reneging from a solemn declaration of no-fiJst-use to 
either threaten or use nuclear weapons, in any contingency short 
of retaliation against nuclear attack, would invite
international opprobrium upon the defaulting nation Some 
greater appreciation is needed of the moral abhorrence agairst 
use of nuclear weapons, which has thus far obtained, as a 
powerful dissuasive factor against the initiation of nuclear 
conflict It could be further suggested that, if a declaration 
seems insufficient, a no-first-use pledge could be formalized ir 
an international agreement
(B) Can the Alliance Bear the Costs of Modernizing its 
Conventional Forces Adequately^
In this regard Andre Beaufre has plairly stated
Western Europe with its 200 million inhabitants and more, 
a G N P greater than that of the USSR, has the material 
means to equip its important conventional forces, equal or 
even superior to those of the USSR Naturally, such an 
effort would not be possible unless Europe felt really 
threatenedT-As m  the USSR, it would only cut the stardard of living
And, commenting recently on the outlays needed to upgrade 
the Alliance's conventional forces suitably, General Rogers, 
Supreme Allied Commander m  Europe, observed
It can generally be achieved by the end of this decade if 
all nations will only fulfill m  full the commitments they 
have made for force improvements included m  the Force Goals 
for 1983-84 We calculate at SHAPE that meeting these goals 
will require an average annual real increase m  Alliarce 
defence spending of about four percent for these six years 
(This constitutes only one percent more than the goal of a 
three-percent annual real increase to which nations aqreed 
in 1977 )16
The Union of Concerned Scientists has estimated that an
outlay of less than $100 bilion, spread over six years, would be 
sufficient to finance the additional measures needed by NATO 
These have been identified as construction of an obstacles-cum- 
fortifications network along the Central Front, increasing war 
stocks and reserves to permit NATO's standing forces maintain 
-Dmbat for another thirty days (present capacity fifteen 
* *ys), pre-positïoning materiel m  Europe to equip two more 
- Lvïsions (present funding allows equipping of four divisions) 
a id/or improving sealift capabilities for this purpose The 
expenditure of $100 billion proposed, it is urged, would only be 
c*ie half of the $200 billion envisaged m  General Roger's 
„roposal 17
All such estimates of the additional outlays required are 
only informed approximations, since they are premised upon 
comparisons of Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional force levels,
V hich are themselves based, as we have seen, upon a large number 
f variable and imponderable factors This entire question of 
osts might be approached in a more radical fashion NATO's 
(resent strategy links the conventional through the tactical 
uclear to the strategic nuclear level of conflict Should tile 
c dditional costs of modernizing NATO's conventional forces seem 
i nconvmcingly large, the costs of the nuclear forces that are 
being relied upon instead becomes relevant It could be argued,
I
consequently, that a proportion of the development and j
deployment costs of current and future strategic, |
intermediate-range and tactical nuclear weapons systems should
17
be added to the costs of conventional forces deployed m  Europe 
Moreover, a first-use policy requires the deployed force 
structure to possess the capability, m  theory, to launch a 
first strike The options available for this purpose are either 
to adopt a launch-on-warning nuclear posture or, preferably, 
acquiring nuclear forces with assured first strike capabilities 
The launch-on-warning nuclear posture is inherently 
destabilizing But, the alternative of acquiring first stride 
forces, besides being destabilizing, would require progressively 
ard increasingly sophisticated nuclear forces, fuelling the 
technological nuclear arms race, with its enormous and 
continuing costs Apart from weapon costs, another relevant 
consideration would be the considerably greater loss of life and 
damage to physical assets in a nuclear conflict Viewed m  this 
perspective the nuclear defence of Europe cannot be more 
cost-effective than its conventional defence
The question, however, arises should the no-first-use
declaration not follow, rather than precede, NATO's conventional
modernization program0 Making this declaration before NATO
modernizes its conventional forces, it is believed, would be
hazardous, because this would "increase the risks of war, and,
if officially agreed in the near term, could create dangerous
uncertainties during that surely long period (at least five
years) which would elapse from its enunciation to redressing the
18imbalance in conventional weapons "
18
On the other hand, Senator Sam Nunn has drawn attention 
to
a growing consensus that less reliance should be 
placed on use of nuclear weapons m  response to a 
conventional Warsaw Pact attack, but there is a widespread 
feeling that a viable nor-nuclear defense is not attairable 
This paradox, coupled with-poiltical and economic 
differences within the Alliance, is causing frustration ir 
AmencaTQand is threatening the very fabric of the Alliance itself,iy
whilst recommending a greater conventional effort, joint and
mutually dependent NATO-Warsaw Pact pledges of no-first-use, 
coupled with avoidance of concentrations of ground— especially 
armour— forces within a specified distance of the inter-German 
border
Moreover, it could be argued with equal felicity that, 
after NATO modernizes its conventional forces, a condition of 
conventional deterrence would obtain making a no-first-use 
declaration redundant The question more germaine to the issue 
is whether this modernization effort has better hypothetical 
possibilities of being made before or after the declaration 
would be made The declaration, m  our view, could assist NATO 
countries achieve the domestic political consensus necessary to 
find the additional resources necessary to upgrade their 
conventional forces for two major reasons
First, past history of NATO's conventional force 
modernization plans makes clear that they would not be seriously 
proceeded with so long as the U S nuclear umbrella is spread
l9
oveir West Europe The earliest attempt to reach agreed Force 
Goals was made m  Lisbon in 1952 20 Subsequent efforts have 
only had partial success, suggesting the need for a more radical 
approach There is nothing to suggest, moreover, that the 
anti-nuclear movements m  West Europe amd the United States 
would not support the incremental increases m  defence 
expenditure needed to obtain greater reassurance that the 
nuclear threshold would, thereafter, be further raised Neither 
is the possibility of seeking non-nuclear deterrence at lower 
levels of conventional arms through conventional arms control 
agreements excluded It is dubious if these esoteric issues 
have been convincingly explained in these terms to concerned 
interest groups, or debated with the anti-nuclear movements to 
derive their support for any larger conventional defence effort
Second, force modernization is not a static concept, but 
is a moving goal for all armed forces This would be especially 
true for NATO/Warsaw Pact forces m  the European theatre, 
wherein the most advanced, state-of-the-art weaponry is 
deployed An adequate balance, deriving from a mutual 
equivalence of conventional arms, would need to be sought withir 
a continuous process This process, too, could either be 
reversed by agreement to freeze conventional arms numbers or 
sophistication m  the European theatre, or pursued more 
hopefully after the shelter provided by the first-use nuclear 
guarantee is forsaken Withdrawal of the nuclear threat and a 
greater emphasis on conventional defense could also encourage
20
more realistic force structures being designed, and better 
utilization of available resources
( C) Is Limited Nuclear Conflict Possible’
The question how a nuclear exchange might be initiated, 
proceeded with in a limited area, limited to a defined rargl of 
ruclear weaponry, and terminated without escalation to general 
nuclear war has never been confidently replied 21 One scenario 
by a noted strategist "forbids any concept of warnirg shots 
which might allow the enemy to "take the initiative in the 
general use of nuclear weapons," whilst envisaging
an opening of atomic fire which, if not massive, is at 
least generalized and simultaneous exploited by deep
counter-attacks to instil panic m  the enemy What is | 
necessary is a counter-offensive counter-thrust it is
highly desirable to have accomplished a mixing-up with leremy 
troops at this time This would be the best protection as 
long as we had the initiative ¿¿ (Emphasis in original1)
Is this scenario realistic’ What political objectives 
could it serve’ How might this conflict be terminated’ 
Indubitably, no precise answers to these hypothetical questions 
are possible But, some reassurance seems necessary that ¿he 
Soviet Union shares the Western perspective on limited nuclear 
corflict before such a conflict could be initiated However, ar 
accepted Soviet authority has affirmed "Ore must emphasize 
that the present international system and the present state of 
military technology will c$use any armed conflict to develop, 
inevitably, into a general war if the nuclear powers are drawr
21
into it n23
This assertion clearly precludes the limited nuclear 
exchanges visualized within the flexible response theory, ard 
promoted m  Western strategic literature But, the Alliance is 
apparently conditioned by the fact that
nuclear strategy and military planning in the West 
still predominantly focus on an image of nuclear war that 
consists of a single campaign the attack and the immediate 
response NATO's doctrine would offer no arswer on
how the destruction unleashed by the use of nuclear weapons 
could be brought to an end in ways that served the 
Alliance's political purpose
These difficulties arise from the cardinal truth that all 
nuclear doctrines are founded upon pure conjecture and 
speculations regarding adversary behavior, and the obtaining 
anomaly that superpower perceptions regarding the conduct of 
nuclear war do not mesh Nor is there any evidence that a 
dialogue proceeds in this regard between them it seems 
insufficient to urge that a state of uncertainty about these 
supremely important questions strengthens deterrence Some 
assurance seems necessary, on the other hand, that a limited 
nuclear conflict would remain limited Political leaders, 
obviously, cannot be expected to initiate a nuclear conflict m  
the serendipitous hope that it will remain limited on cognitive 
assumptions of adversary conduct based on purely logical 
deductions The distinct possibility, moreover, obtains that a 
nuclear exchange could escalate due to incorrect appreciation of
22
a/ailable intelligence during the conflict The "fog of war," 
incidentally, might be thicker m  a limited conflict with troops 
u 5m g  dispersed and communications disrupted along the front, 
which could further affect leadership rationality functionrg ir 
conditions of high stress Strategic man, after all, is a 
logician's dream It would be realistic to believe, therefore, 
that the likßlihood of general nuclear war inheres within any 
tieory of limited nuclear conflict, and non-use of nuclear 
weapons, consequently, is the most effective limitation of these 
-argers
There is also the question whether the damage m  a nuclear 
conflict, however limited, would be acceptable, considering the 
fact that such a conflict would be initiated in a defensive mode 
ta stave off a conventional defeat and would be fought m  West 
European territory The results of "Operation Carte Blanche"— a 
war game simulating nuclear war m  West Germany-Lowlands- 
Northeastern France m  June 1955— are instructive The 
hypothetical use of 355 tactical nuclear weapons on military 
targets in this area was estimated to cause the death of 1 7 
illion and injuries to 3 5 million people 25 These casualties 
are considerable underestimates because radiation figures were 
deluded from the casualties Needless to add, the variables in 
n s  exercise viz conflict theatre, targets, number and 
lethality of the weapons used can be altered to arrive at far 
Tire horrendous results Given the extent, moreover, of 
destruction within the war theatre, there would be little
Zò
difference between the use of tactical, theatre-nuclear or 
strategic weapons in such limited conflict
Consideration also needs being given to the obtamirg 
reality that nuclear weapons are a distinct form of weaporry, 
and to the continuing precedent that there has never beer ary 
nuclear exchange Since the danger of escalation makes the 
probability of any nuclear conflict probable, and its graduating 
problematical, an interntional effort has proceeded to 
strengthen the absolute prohibition against the use of nuclear 
weapons in conflict This would explain the consensus reached 
on not "conventionalizing" nuclear weapons despite some 
technological momentum in that direction, and on keeping the 
"firebreak" between nuclear and conventional weapons clearly 
distinguishable 26 it has been conjectured, incidentally, that 
the first incident of nuclear weapons use would erode existing 
inhibitions against their use, and establish a role for them m  
future conflicts 27
For all these reasons, it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that a limited nuclear conflict does not appear
militarily feasible, apart from political arguments ir its 
disfavor
Would a No-First-Use Declaration Decouple the United States 
----- ?.nd West Europe, Unravelling the Atlantic Alliance?
¿4
Coupling, it is urged, establishes the link between the 
defence of Europe and 0 S nuclear forces Therefore, a 
no-first-use declaration would segregate the defence of West 
Europe from nuclear risks to the United States such decoupling 
of the equal risks to the United States and West Europe, it is 
further urged, would destroy Alliance unity De Gaulle's 
rhetorical question whether the United States would risk New 
York to save Paris has become more obtuse with strategic parity 
being established by the Soviet Union, heightening these 
suspicions
A limited nuclear conflict, as we have seen, is an 
unviable option Moreover, the very stability of the Central 
Strategic Balance might preclude escalation of the conflict 
More specifically, the superpowers could decide that ar 
extension of the nuclear conflict beyond Europe would needlessly 
entail their destruction, resulting in a de facto decoupling of 
American and European defence American troops in Europe, 
however, are perceived to establish the link between the defense 
of Europe and the u S nuclear deterrent, in that their 
engagement in a Soviet offensive would strengthen U S resolve 
to use nuclear weapons for defending Europe This particular 
"tirp-wire,” too, it is conceivable, may not trigger the nuclear 
response, given the real possibility of general nuclear war 
ensuing The coupling linkage, after all, is created by US 
perceptions of its vital national interests at stake, and this 
might explain continuing US emphasis on upgrading conventional
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forces
It could be argued, nevertheless, that the threat of use 
of nuclear weapons, embodied m  the first-use policy, and the 
uncertainty generated by that threat, has palpable deterrert 
value As perceived "An image of the holocaust must never be 
allowed to slip from the minds of our statesmen What does make 
serse is for NATO to plan its military operations or the 
presumption that nuclear forces will not be used and should rot 
be needed " The question, however, persists Given the 
difficulties m  conducting and terminating a limited nuclear 
conflict, could even the threat of launching such a conflict, 
except as a very last resort, seem credible’ Is it not probable 
that, with the passage of time, NATO's basic dilemmas continuing 
unresolved, and further knowledge accruing about the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the credibility of this last 
resort threat would not erode further’ Further, would the area 
of hypothetical impermissible Soviet behavior to be countered by 
NATO with conventional forces not enlarge, as last resort 
contingencies become more nebulous’ As visualized by Michael 
Howard the expected Soviet attack, moreover,
if it occurred at all, would be likely to arise out of 
a political crisis m  Central Europe over the rights and 
wrongs of which Western public opinion would be deeply and 
perhaps justifiably divided Soviet military objectives 
would probably extend no farther than the Rhine, if mdeed 
that far Under such conditions, the political will of the 
West to initiate nuclear war might have to be discounted 
entirely, and the defence of West Germany would depend rot 
on our nuclear arsenals but on the operational capabilities 
of our armed forces, fighting as best they could and for as
26
long as they could without recourse to nuclear weapons of any kind ^  *
Another question germaine to the decoupling problem is 
whether a no-first-use declaration would force the Federal 
Republic to seek its nuclear option An independent Germar 
nuclear deterrent seems precluded, however, for the indefinite 
future by political realities, notably the inevitability of 
violent Soviet and adverse Western reaction, apart from the 
possibility of domestic upheavals Confronted with the prospect 
of NATO retrenching its security responsibilities to the Federal 
Republic, it is more likely to choose neutralism to the nuclear 
option It is apparent, however, that a no-first-use 
declaration could hardly be construed as any retrenchment of 
NATO responsibilities, since its considerable conventional 
forces would remain available to the Federal Republic
There remains the political dimensions of the decoupling 
problem The assertion that a nuclear commitment by the Urited 
States to the defence of West Europe strengthens their political 
linkage seems an overstated proposition, especially as there is 
greater assurance now that the Soviet threat has been 
exaggerated over the years Geography, however, creates 
differing perceptions of the Soviet threat within the Alliance 
For the Europeans the Soviet Union is a contiguous military 
- for the United States it is a global adversary
establishing the Central Strategic Balance Whilst the 
Europeans and the Americans have a common interest, therefore,
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in managing the Alliance's relations with the Soviet Union, 
large differences obtain over the manner m  which this might be 
achieved The Europeans are more broadly inclined towards ar 
accommodative approach, whilst the Americans are more inclined 
to exploit perceived weaknesses* m  the Soviet system Numerous 
other examples, randomly chosen, like economic relatiors with 
the Eastern Bloc, managing the oil crisis, non-proliferation 
issue, new international economic order, relations with the 
Middle East and so on, reveal basic differences between the 
Europeans and the Americans on a wide range of issues This was 
evident even during crises like Korea, Suez, Vietnam and the 
Arab-Israeli wars Doubts also exist about the American nuclear
commitment to Europe on both sides of the Atlantic Further, 
there are a range of politico-military issues like strategic 
arms limitations where the United States and the Soviet Unior 
have legitimately established direct communications to manage 
the Central Strategic Balance An exclusion of allies from this 
hierarchical level of interaction, despite genuflections towards 
consultative processes with them is, perhaps, unavoidable, but 
hardly reassuring to the Allies
In fact, the essential point to be noted m  the European 
peace movement is the doubts they have sown regarding the wisdom 
of coupling European defence to the US nuclear forces Besides, 
the West European anxiety regarding dominance arises.*admittedly 
m  different ways, from both the Soviet Union and the United 
States, along with a greater fear of being drawn into their
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embroils it is believed, in fact, that
nil, the nuclear wajr anticipated is not seen as one arisira out of a Soviet attack on Western Europe, but rather frnm  ^
some self-sustaining process of escalafón, perhaps
c!isedabvn?henwhoieXtra'EUIrepean confllct' but essentially
■gettino ou£ of c o n ^ ? 3?3^,3 nucleaB weaP°"S in some way OUi °f contro1 Nuclear war is widely seer as a Y 2 .^ng an sich, unrelated to the existing political situatior 
or to any security requirements likely to arise out of it
prospect of nuclear war itself, rather 
reassurance 3ttaCk' that the Eur°Peans now require
Besides, the continuing persistence of seminal, political 
differences within the European members of the Alliarce-which 
has reflected in their inability to establish an European 
deterrent force-makes the unity-through-coupling argument 
somewhat egregious West Germany, m  fact, has not encouraged 
French overtures to increase defence linkages between the two 
countries Paradoxically, a decrease in fears of major 
aggression by the Soviet Union now obtains as the Iron Curtain 
is approached with the Federal Republic actively seeking to 
balance its Westpolitik with its emotional urge towards 
Ostpolitik The Europeans would be satisfied if the Russians 
were sensitised to the dangers of major intransigence, but the 
m a m  problem seen is to keep the Alliance in working order
The basic tensions within NATO arise from the dependence 
of west Europe upon the nuclear commitment to its defence by the 
United states, leading to West European scepticism regarding the 
ommitment, and U S irritation with West Europe's failure 
to provide for its conventional defences A no-first-use
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declaration, by removing these difficulties, would ensure a more
satisfactory balance within the Alliance West European
countries, thereby, would be enabled to play a role in the
international system more consistent with their political and
economic aspirations The consequent autonomy and devolution of
responsibilities to the West European countries could strengthen
the unity of the Alliance by emphasizing its federal character
This factor gains significance with a new generation of leaders
coming to power on both sides of the Atlantic, unburdened by
earlier sentimentality, or feelings of either remorse of 
gratitude
West European attitudes also reveal that, although the 
coupling role of the nuclear deterrent is desired, the 
consequences of nuclear defence are abhorred This is reflected 
in various prescriptive solutions that seek to ensure the 
defence of Europe without placing European territories at risk, 
which is hardly intended within an extended deterrent posture ’ 
These problems have surfaced whenever new weapon systems like 
enhanced radiation weapons or intermediate-range nuclear forces 
were sought to be deployed m  Europe Compromises reached m
this regard are essentially bargains on the form and structure 
of coupling accepted The attendant controversies have created 
differences within political parties, and have greatly 
strengthened the anti-nuclear movements in Europe Neither of 
these newer developments is likely to be reversed in the absence 
of radical changes in NATO's obtaining nuclear posture Should
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the peace movements, focussing upon these issues, challenge 
existing nuclear weapon deployments m  Europe, the obtaining 
differences in the political structures of Alliance countries 
would be further widened It is arguable, m  these 
circumstances, whether a no-first-use declaration, by shiftirg 
the emphasis from nuclear to conventional forces, would not 
foster, rather than weaken, Alliance unity
Perceptions of Other Nuclear Weapons Powers
It would be useful, at this stage, to evaluate the 
position of the nuclear weapon powers on the broader question of 
non-use of nuclear weapons The origins of this thesis car be 
traced to the Baruch Plan of 1954 proposing that nuclear weapons 
be banned Efforts m  this direction proceeded m  the United 
Nations A significant declaration was made by the General 
Assembly in 1961 stating that use of nuclear weapons would be 
violative of the UN Charter, and a "crime against humanity and 
civilization " This declaration was supported by the Soviet 
Union and its allies, but opposed by the United States and its 
NATO partners The United States has not agreed to Soviet 
persuasions that a no-first-use declaration be jointly issued 31 
The Soviet Union has, at various times, also suggested the issue 
of an universal no-first-use pledge, combining of a ban on use 
of nuclear weapons with a ban on use of force, and a NATO-Warsaw 
Pact no-first-use agreement 32 China declared its unequivocal 
commitment to a no-first-use posture after it achieved nuclear
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status in 1964 In fact,
The Chinese also suggested that a first step, for a world 
summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament, should be 
an agreement by nuclear and near-nuclear powers not to use 
nuclear weapons In spite of acrimonious Sino-Soviet 
^iffö^snces on almost all other issues, Premier Kosygin 
accepted the proposal Other nuclear powers did rot ^
At the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly 
devoted to disarmament held in June 1982, the Soviet Unor made 
a unilateral no-first-use declaration in terms which might be 
seen m  Appendix II, along with the statements made by the other 
nuclear weapons powers on this question m  both the Special 
Sessions on disarmament The position of the United States was 
reflected more clearly m  the concluding remarks made by the 
American delegation to the Second Special Sessior, viz "Our 
own policy— that is, the policy of all Atlantic Alliance 
members— goes far beyond this pledge As the leaders of NATO 
declared at their 1982 Bonn summit, 'None of our weapons will 
ever be used except m  response to an attack ' This is our 
pledge and our policy "34
An analysis of these statements reveals a striking 
parallel between the American and British positions, and the 
parallelism that has emerged between the Soviet and Chinese 
positions France remains singular, but its position is broadly 
supportive of the Western Alliance The U K and Frarce have 
not shown any interest in a no-first-use pledge It car be 
reasonably surmised, however, that the U K , having formally 
linked its deterrent to NATO, would follow the U S lead m  this
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matter France is unlikely to do so, and emphasize the 
independent quality of its nuclear deterrent The French 
nuclear posture is distinguished by its deliberately contrived 
ambiguity and a force structure based on first strike weapons 35 
Continuance, however, of an isolated nuclear posture by France 
would become difficult in view of the costs involved, and 
appreciating the slight security rationale justifying its 
nuclear deterrent Crucial to any revision, therefore, in 
NATO's position on the no-first-use issue would be a change m  
American perceptions The declaratory policy of the United 
States, however, has remained virtually unchanged between the 
two Special Sessions on disarmament, except that narrow, 
restrictive language has given way to a firmer declaration that 
nuclear weapons would only be used m  a defensive mode
Some greater recognition seems necessary here of the 
geo-strategic vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union The other 
nuclear weapon powers are m  an asymmetric position to the 
Soviet Union permitting air/missile strikes by its adversaries 
from all points of the compass, exacerbating its problems of 
nuclear defence These difficulties are compounded by its m a m  
sea-routes to the Oceans lying through narrow straits that can 
be blocked Further the economic and general technological 
inferiority of the Soviet Union to sustain an arms race with the 
United States is apparent These factors, of which the 
Europeans have a more realistic appraisal, may explain why the 
Soviet union has shown a continued interest in the no-first-use
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pledge, apart from some greater confidence in its conventional 
capabilities to resist NATO attack
Of greater consequence here is the isolation of the 
Western nuclear powers, on this'issue, within the international 
system A no-first-use declaration is seer by states outside 
the NATO/Warsaw Pact military alliances as being an important
first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament A/
resolution to this effect has been adopted by the UN General 
Assembly for the past three years (text maybe seen in Appendix 
III) The voting pattern thereon reveals a majority of the
non-aligned countries and the Eastern bloc supporting the 
resolution and the Western bloc opposing it The concern of the 
non-bloc, non-nuclear weapon states arises from their legitimate 
fear that, in the event of nuclear conflict, they will not 
escape its largely unknown physical effects deriving from 
radioactive fallout, depletion of the ozone layer, and the 
nuclear winter 36 In that sense, nuclear conflict violates the 
rights of neutrals guaranteed by the Hague Convention Their 
hopes are, therefore, pinned upon a nuclear truce, since a 
nuclear-free world appears to be an utopian dream
Other Benefits of Declaration
Perhaps, these are peripheral concerns for the Western 
nuclear powers The problem of making extended deterrence more 
credible, however, has not found any certain solution, which has
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reflected in the periodical surfacing of doubts and 
recriminations over the years Witness, for instance, the great 
alarm m  West Europe, possibly greater than m  the Soviet Unor, 
over the U S plan to deploy enhanced radiation weapons m  
Europe, or fire nuclear weapons for "demonstration” purposes A 
ro-first-use declaration could persuade NATO either to provide 
for an adeguate conventional defence, or to manage its adversary 
relationship with the Warsaw Pact at the conventional level 
This would relieve NATO from its present commitment to ar 
uncertain nuclear posture, and enable it to stem divisive trends 
within the Alliance on this question NATO's self-interests 
would be more demonstrably served m  five other ways by makirg 
this declaration, which are described below
First, it needs appreciation that the actual decision to 
take recourse to nuclear weapons m  an European conflict 
situation will not be easy, should that unfortunate contingency 
arise Quite apart from the irreversibility of that decision to 
initiate a nuclear exchange, with its escalation dangers, a real 
possibility obtains of conflict in Europe being triggered by an 
East European crisis, or tensions m  the Middle East, Northeast 
Asia or Southern Africa It would be difficult for 
decision-making elites m  NATO countries to seek national 
consensus for meeting such a crisis m  the European theatre with 
nuclear arms A no-first-use declaration would relieve NATO's 
leaders from making these painful choices, and engender greater 
eff°rts and confidence m  managing these crises with
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conventional forces and without crossing the nuclear threshold
Second, the declaration would include South Korea and the 
Gulf region within its ambit where the use of nuclear weapors 
has also been contemplated The problem of utilizing nuclear 
weapons m  these regional conflict situations is subject to the 
same infirmities as noticed for Europe viz danger of limited 
nuclear war escalating to general war levels, destruction of 
territories sought to be saved from aggression, conventional 
defence and deterrence being possible and so or Another 
constraint on nuclear weapons threats or use would be subsequert 
difficulties in retaining US bases in these regions, as public 
demonstrations could be expected against them, especially ir 
Japan The declaration would relieve the United States, ir 
particular, from adhering to nuclear guarantees for the defence 
of these regions with its unpredictable uncertainties, and, 
further, of being called upon to offer similar, extended 
deterrence security to its allies in the future
Third, a general perception obtains that nuclear weapons 
form the currency of power and function as the guarantors of 
peace and stability m  the international system The mystique, 
therefore, which attaches to these weapons encourages horizontal 
proliferation A no-first-use declaration, by relegating 
nuclear weapons from their present central strategic role to a 
residual deterrent role, would perceptibly erode such beliefs 
It would be tendentious to suggest that such a declaration by
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the Western nuclear powers would halt horizontal proliferation 
A distinction needs to be drawn between countries like Israel, 
South Africa, India, Pakistan and Argentina, which have either 
displayed or possess or are likely to shortly possess a ruclear 
explosive capability, and other aspirants to nuclear status, who 
do not have the technological capabilities at present, ard reed 
to strive against the control over nuclear technology 
dissemination achieved by the Nuclear Suppliers' Group 
Demystifying the mystique of nuclear weapons, by emphasizing its 
purely deterrent role, would reduce the prestige motivatior for 
the latter group of countries to acquire such weapons Ary 
efforts, obviously, to reduce or postpone the emergence of more 
nuclear weapons powers needs to be commended, since it would 
alleviate the danger of nuclear conflicts between second-rurg 
nuclear weapon powers, and catalytic nuclear wars between 
existing nuclear weapon powers Furthermore, a no-first-use 
declaration would greatly strengthen perceptions m  the emerging 
nuclear weapon powers that these weapons could only serve the 
ends of deterrence and not war-fighting
Fourth, altogether too much attention has focussed, thus 
far, on levelling up NATO's conventional forces with the Warsaw 
Pact, without appreciating the fact that European members of 
NATO have little incentive to improve their conventional forces, 
if this connotes any reduction in the American efforts for the 
defence of Europe Too little attention, consequently, has beer 
given to either stabilizing existing force levels or seekirg
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lower conventional force balances It might bear mention that 
conventional forces, too, can have destabilizing effects 
Dual-capable weapon systems like surface-to-surface missiles 
could be used for launching conventional strikes against nuclear 
missiles An engagement between'the superpowers to resolve such 
problems would seem essential as conventional force 
modernization proceeds This suggests greater attertion to the 
MBFR negotiatons that have been lingering without any progress 
for years,37 without appreciating that the size and 
sophistication of conventional forces m  Europe have the 
potential to exacerbate latent conflicts Important concessions 
regarding on-site inspection of troop flows within "reduction 
zones" have recently been made by the Soviets There is also a 
willingness by the United States to reach agreement on 
irspection procedures and ignore, for the present, insistence or 
symmetrical troop withdrawals 38 These concessions would 
greatly assist in reaching a MBFR agreement Further agreements 
to set ceilings upon land/air force personnel and major 
equipment deployed in Central Europe, coupled with 
understandings on maneuvers and inspection procedures, would 
considerably assuage NATO fears of a surprise attack by the 
Warsaw Pact A no-first-use declaration, by placing greater 
emphasis on conventional arms, could both improve the ambience 
for reaching a MBFR accord, and for extending the confidence 
building and transparency measures visualized in the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document
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Fifth, the present state of American-Soviet relations, 
distinguished by a high level of mutual recrimination and 
absence of cooperation, carries the attendant risk of leadirg 
to dangerous confrontations, particularly in regions central to 
their concerns Any process that could result m  eroding 
tensions could be stabilizing and might strengthen the impulse 
towards nuclear disarmament The present hiatus between the 
United States and the Soviet Union— deriving largely from a 
Manichaean view of the Soviets by the American establishment, 
has reflected m  the non-ratification of SALT-II, lack of 
progress m  START/INF negotiatlations and the failure to reach a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Increasingly sophisticated 
nuclear weapon systems are being steadily deployed, m  part to 
reaffirm the credibility of the nuclear deterrent, but 
compounding, simultaneously, the dangers of a nuclear corflict 
by accident, jeopardizing existing arms control agreements and 
rendering future agreements increasingly difficult to secure A 
real danger has arisen of the arms race being exterded irto 
space, fuelled by beliefs that nuclear deterrence might be 
secured, apart from assuring mutual destruction, by assuring 
mutual invulnerability The "star wars" strategy, promoting 
esoteric measures and counter-measures m  space, would greatly 
accelerate the on-going nuclear arms race, and add immeasurably 
to both the expenses of this race and the insecurities bred by 
it Indeed, any agreement to keep nuclear weapons out of 
space— a Soviet draft treaty is available for initiating 
discussions— would be a momentous contribution to nuclear arms
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control Further, differences on a Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty have narrowed considerably, and its conclusion would 
greatly assist the non-proliferation objective These measures, 
along with a mutual freeze on nuclear arms and a bar or chemical 
weapons, has been suggested by Chernenko in his first major 
public address 39 m  the prevailing milieu, the establishment 
of an ambience between the superpowers wherein hostility ard 
mistrust could be eroded, and rationality prevail over 
emotionalism, seems more important than the promise of reduction 
in nuclear arsenals A no-first-use declaration, by softening 
the edges of present tensions and suspicions between the 
superpowers, would assuredly improve the climate for ongoing and 
future nuclear arms control and disarmament measures
Conclusion
In essence, the purpose of war is to achieve specific 
political objectives that a state believes are vital for its 
national interests This further suggests that any conflict 
must have a reasonable prospect of being capable of establishing 
a more favorable situation, else it would be feckless for a 
state to initiate the conflict The most obvious implication of 
nuclear parity, however, is to render nuclear weapons 
essentially unuseable The theory of nuclear deterrence, it 
bears recollection, is based on the balance of terror and is 
premised upon the threat of mutual assured destruction But, 
this theory was developed after nuclear stockpiles had been
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accumulated, emphasizing the subsidiary role of doctrine as the 
handmaid of technology Even a radical decrease now m  existirg 
stockpiles, say by half, however improbable this might appear, 
would still leave sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy humar 
civilization many times over Nuclear conflict must be equated, 
therefore, with the apocalypse, making any threat of use of 
nuclear weapons, with its dangerous consequences that 
concomitantly arise, quite meaningless A strategy fourded upor 
repulsing a nuclear adversary by initiating a nuclear corflict, 
consequently, becomes incomprehensible, since the adversary is 
capable of countering the nuclear strike with a devastating 
nuclear riposte A policy, therefore, based on the threat of 
using nuclear weapons, however high the threshold might be 
raised, embodies the consequence of mutual suicide, and can 
hardly be termed viable Yet, it is precisely this danger of 
mutual destruction which inheres m  NATO's first-use policy 
The central problem which derives, thereafter, is making the 
threat of first-use credible, whereas there is little 
inclination to carry out that threat Should a contingency 
arise when NATO's threat would need to be implemented the choice 
presented would be between executing the threat— leading to 
mutual obliteration or seeking a humiliating compromise Ir 
both cases NATO would be worse off than before
This line of argumentation might suggest a review of 
current strategic thought, and a reversion to the elemertal 
values contained m  primeval doctrine suggesting that nuclear
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weapons, being highly dangerous, cannot be used except for 
retaliatory purposes, and forsaking the temptations of selective 
targeting doctrines that have heightened insecurity at enormous 
economic costs This review would not be unjustified, because 
the technological progression of the nuclear arms race and its 
growing dangers can be linked with the siren-lure of selective 
targeting doctrines that have refined the flexible response 
strategy Arguing, moreover, within the weapons dialectic it is 
now perceived that short-range surface-to-surface nuclear 
missiles, atomic demolition munitions and atomic cannon deployed 
along the East-West border engender an "use-or-lose" 
psychology since they can be overrun in a conflict-and are 
destabilizing They were originally intended for a tactical 
role to strenghten the European deterrent Simultaneously, 
there is greater confidence that operational tasks requiring 
tactical nuclear weapons can be left to conventional weaponry as 
their lethality and accuracy improves This would further 
suggest that credible deterrence can be established at the
conventional, apart from the nuclear, level in the Europear 
theatre
Our argument resolves into urging finally that a strategy 
which has a substantial likelihood of leading to mutual suicide 
is unconvincing It needs to be replaced by a more credible 
no first use policy, placing the emphasis on conventional forces 
and relegating nuclear weapons to their original purpose of 
assuring deterrence against nuclear aggression
4-2-
a p p e n d i x  i
Comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces
NATO Warsaw Pact
(including (including Ratio NATO
U S ) Soviet) Warsaw Pact
(A) Manpower (000)
Total personnel 4,991 6,068 1 1 22
Reserves 5,345 6,718 1 1 26
Total ground forces m
Europe (including Kola 1.985 1 714 1 1 fi lPeninsula and Trans X XO X
Caucasus)
(b) Armour
Main Battle Tanks 20,722 25,490 1 1 23
(+19,200)# (1 2 16)
Artillery, Multiple 8,996 11,830 1 1 32
Rocket Launchers (+10,000)# (1 2 43)
(C) Combat Aircraft
Fighter Ground Attack 2,786 1,685 1 30 1
(+ 900) * (1 1 18)
Fighters 212 700 1 3 30
(+1,000)* (1 8 02)
Armed helicopters 1,195 786 1 52 1
Note # Estimated from western and southern Theatres, less TurkestanMilitary district 
* Estimated
The Military Balance 1983-1984 (London International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), pp 138-39
Source
First Special Session Second Special Session
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APPENDIX II I
UNITED STATES
“The United States will not use 
nuclear weapons against any non­
nuclear State party to the non­
proliferation Treaty or to any 
comparable internationally 
binding commitment not to acquire 
nuclear explosive devices, except_ 
m  the case of an attack on the 
United States, its territories or 
armed forces, or its allies, by 
such a State allied to a nuclear- 
weapon State or associated with 
nuclear-weapon State m  carrying 
out or sustaining the attack "
(A/S-10/AC 1/LV 9)
SOVIET UNION
"The Soviet Union declared -f-hat it 
will never use nuclear weapons 
against those States which renounce 
the protection and acquisition of 
nuclear weapons and have no nuclear 
weapons on their territories Uc 
are ready to conclude special 
agreements to that effect with any 
such non-nuclear State We call 
upon all other nuclear Powers to 
follow our example and assure 
similar obligations " (A/S-10/AC 1/4)
UNITED KINGDOM
"I accordingly give the following 
assurance, on behalf of my Govern­
ment, to non-nuclear-weapon States 
which are parties to the non­
proliferation Treaty or to other 
internationally binding commitments 
not to manufacture or acquire 
nuclear explosive devices Britain 
undertakes not to use nuclear 
weapons against such States except 
m  the case of an attack on the 
United Kingdom, its dependent ter­
ritories, its armed forces or its 
allies by such a State m  associa­
tion or alliance with a nuclear- 
weapon State " (A/S-10/PV 26)
I"We who have signed the United Nationi 
Charter have pledged to refrain from 
tne threat or use of force against t h Ä  
territory or independence of any w  
State In these times the peace- 
loving nations of the world must 
pledge again to act in a way that is 
worthy of the ideals that we have 
endorsed " (A/S-12/PV 16) m
" the Soviet State solemnly 
declares the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics assumes an obliga 
tion not to be the first to use 
nuclear weapons This obligation 
shall become effective immediately at 
the moment it is made public from the 
rostrum of the United Nations General 
Assembly " (A/S-12/PV 18)
I"And our key need is not for promises 
against first use of this or that 
kind of military weapon, such promise 
can never be dependable amid the 
stresses of war We need a credible 
assurance, if such can ever be 
obtained, against starting military 
action at all The leaders of the 
North Atlantic Alliance have ¡just 
given a solemn collective undertakinc 
to precisely that effect They said 
"None of our weapons will ever be 
used except m  response to attack " A  
(A/S-12/PV 24) m
I
»
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FRANCE
"In terms of their security, the 
decision by the States of a region 
to preserve a nuclear-free status 
should entail an obligation for 
the nuclear-weapon States to 
refrain from seeking a military 
advantage from this situation 
Nuclear-weapon States should m  
particular preclude, according to 
a formula to be defined, any use 
or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons against States that are 
part of a nuclear-free zone " 
(A/S-10/PV 3)
CHINA
"We have on many occasions 
stated that we will at no time 
and m  no circumstances be the 
first to use nuclear weapons 
A measure of urgency is for all 
nuclear countries to undertake 
not to resort to the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons against the 
non-nuclear countries and nuclear- 
free zones " (A/S-10/PV 7)
" France believes that these 
guarantees [“against nuclear 
aggression^ should be applied m  
general to all non-nuclear States 
For its part, it states that it 
will not use nuclear arms against 
a State that does not have them, 
except if an act of aggression is 
carried out m  association or 
alliance with a nuclear-weapon 
State against France or against a 
State with which France has a 
security commitment " (A/S-12/FV 9)
"An agreement should be reached by 
all the nuclear States not to use 
nuclear weapons Pending such an 
agreement, each nuclear State 
should, without attaching any con­
dition, undertake not to use 
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
States and nuclear-weapor-free 
zones, and not to be the first to 
use such weapons against each 
other at any time and under any 
circumstances " (A/S-12/PV 8)
4 7APPENDIX III *
Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons
The States Parties to this Convention,
Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by 
the existence of nuclear weapons,
Convinced that any use of nuclear weapons constitutes a violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations and a crime against humanity,
Convinced that this Convention would be a step towards the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons leading to general and complete disarma­
ment under strict and effective international control,
Determined to continue negotiations for the achievement of thisgoal,
Have agreed as follows
Article 1
The States Parties to this Convention solemnly undertake not to 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances
Article 2
This Convention shall be of unlimited duration
Article 3
1 This Convention shall be open to all States for signature Any 
State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force 
m  accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at 
any time
2 This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory 
States Instruments of ratification or accession shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
3 This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of instru­
ments of ratification by 25 Governments, including the Governments of 
the five nuclear-weapon States, m  accordance with paragraph 2 of 
this article
4 For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited after the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter 
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratifica­
tion or accession
5 The depositary shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding 
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each 
instrument of ratification or accession and the date of the entry into 
force of this Convention, as well as of the receipt of other notices
46
6 This Convention shall be registered by the depositary m  
accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations
Article 4
This Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian and Spanish texts arer equally authentic, shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send 
dulY certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized 
thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention,opened for signature at _______________ on the day
of___________________ _ one thousand nine hundred and
r ‘
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